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Abstract
”Value alignment” (VA) is considered as one of the top
priorities in AI research. Much of the existing research focuses
on the “A” part and not the “V” part of “value alignment.”
This paper corrects that neglect by emphasizing the “value”
side of VA and analyzes VA from the vantage point of
requirements in value theory, in particular, of avoiding the
“naturalistic fallacy”–a major epistemic caveat. The paper
begins by isolating two distinct forms of VA: “mimetic” and
“anchored.” Then it discusses which VA approach better avoids
the naturalistic fallacy. The discussion reveals stumbling
blocks for VA approaches that neglect implications of the
naturalistic fallacy. Such problems are more serious in mimetic
VA since the mimetic process imitates human behavior that
may or may not rise to the level of correct ethical behavior.
Anchored VA, including hybrid VA, in contrast, holds more
promise for future VA since it anchors alignment by normative
concepts of intrinsic value.
As artificial intelligence (AI) techniques (e.g., machine
learning) are rapidly adopted for automating decisions,
societal worries about the compatibility of AI and human
values are growing (Kissinger 2018). In response, some
suggest that “value alignment” (hereafter VA) is one of the
top priorities in AI research (Soares and Fallenstein 2014;
Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark 2015). The idea of VA dates
back to Alan Turing, who wrote about the need for machines
to adapt to human standards:
“[T]he machine must be allowed to have contact with
human beings in order that it may adapt itself to their
standards” (Turing 1995; Estrada 2018).
More recently, Russell et al (2015) highlighted the need for
VA and identified two options for achieving it:
“[A]ligning the values of powerful AI systems with our
own values and preferences ... [could involve either] a
system [that] infers the preferences of another rational
or nearly rational actor by observing its behavior ... [or]
could be explicitly inspired by the way humans acquire
ethical values.”
Motivated by the growing need for alignment, some VA
researchers (Riedl and Harrison 2016; Arnold, Kasenberg,
and Scheutz 2017; Vamplew et al. 2018) emphasize the
former of these approaches, namely, an inverse reinforcement
technique in which a system infers preferences from human
behavior(Abbeel and Ng 2004). Other researchers take the
second approach, namely, explicit emulation of the manner
in which humans acquire values.
However, both approaches agree in their focus. Both
focus on the “A” part and not the “V” part of “value
alignment.” Both neglect the underlying interpretation of
the meaning of “value” that may help clarify implications for
effecting alignment itself. This paper corrects that neglect by
emphasizing the “value” side of VA and analyzes VA from the
vantage point of requirements in value theory, in particular,
of avoiding the “naturalistic fallacy”—a major epistemic
caveat.1 The paper begins by isolating two distinct forms
of VA, namely, “mimetic” and “anchored” and proceeds
to show that anchored VA approaches are more likely to
avoid the naturalistic fallacy than mimetic ones. In turn, the
most promising avenue for VA advancement is an anchored
approach.
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Coined originally in 1903 by the Cambridge philosopher,
G. E. Moore, the expression “naturalistic fallacy” has
come to mark the conceptual error of reducing normative
prescriptions, i.e., action-guiding propositions, to descriptive
propositions without remainder. While not a formal fallacy,
it signals a form of epistemic naivete, one that ignores
the axiom in value theory that “no ‘ought’ can be derived
directly from an ‘is.”’ Disagreements about the robustness
of the fallacy abound, so this paper adopts a modest,
workable interpretation coined recently by Daniel Singer,
namely, “There are no valid arguments from non-normative
premises to a relevantly normative conclusion”(Singer 2015).
Descriptive (or naturalistic) statements are reportive of what
states of affairs are like, whereas normative statements are
stipulative and action-guiding. Examples of the former are
“The grass is green” and “Many people find deception to
be unethical.” Examples of the latter are “You ought not
murder” and “Lying is unethical.” Normative statements
usually figure in the semantics of deontic (obligation-based)
or evaluative expressions such as “ought,” “impermissible,”
“wrong,” ’good,” ”bad,” or ”unethical.”
1Value theory is a subcategory in philosophy that includes meta-
ethics, normative ethics, applied ethics and aesthetics. It is also
called “axiology.”
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Now consider the following argument:
• Premise) “Few people tell the truth.”
• Conclusion)“Therefore, not telling the truth is ethical.“
This argument commits the naturalistic fallacy. The point
is not that the conclusion is wrong, but that it is invalid to
draw the normative conclusion directly from the descriptive
premise. Valid argumentation is non-amplitative in the sense
that information that is not contained in premises should
not appear in the conclusion. Thus, if the full set of the
premise does not contain any normative/ethical statement,
the conclusion should not contain any ethical component.
This epistemic caveat can be summarized as follows:
• For any ordered pair of argument 〈p, c〉, where p means
the full set of the premise that grounds the conclusion
and c means the conclusion, if c is normative and c is
fully grounded just by p, then p contains at least one
normative statement (adapted from Woods and Maguire,
2017).
This can be formally represented as follows:
• Let Np = Some set of the premise(s) is normative.
• Let Nc = The conclusion is normative.
• Let Gc = The conclusion is grounded just by the full
set of the premises.
∀c∀p〈c, p〉(Nc ∧Gc→ Np)
Thus, through modus tollens,
∀c∀p〈c, p〉
(
¬Np→ (¬Nc ∨ ¬Gc))
Namely, if the premises do not contain any normative
element, the conclusion is not normative or the normative
element in the conclusion, if any, is groundless. Regardless
of whether or not deception is pervasive, deception can be
unethical or ethical. Pervasiveness and ethicality are distinct
issues.2
One may object that while a purely descriptive premise
cannot ground justifiable value alignment, a high-level
domain-general premise such as “machines ought to have
our values” might successfully link a descriptive premise to
a normative conclusion. The objection is correct, but only to
a point. The premise that machines ought to have our values
will, indeed, allow a normative conclusion when combined
with a factual premise, but one that is structurally flawed.
First, research about human values shows that most people’s
behavior includes a small but significant amount of cheating,
which if imitated by machines would cause harm (Bazerman
and Tenbrunsel 2011). Second, and connected to this problem,
lies a conceptual difficulty. The premise,“machines should
2The latter case—“¬Gc”– is a bit more complicated. Consider
the following: Premise) “Few people tell the truth.” Conclusion)
“Thus, not all people are truth-tellers or deception is ethical.” This
is, formally, a valid argument, and there is nothing wrong with
something normative abruptly appearing in the conclusion as part
of a disjunction. But the normative element here is groundless—not
grounded by any set of the premise—, so we cannot advance our
normative inquiry in the case of “¬Gc.”
have our values” is ultimately self-defeating insofar as even
humans do not want to have the values they observe in other
humans. They know that the inherent distinction between
what is and what ought to be means that they will observe
both good and bad behavior in others. This outcome has
significant implications on VA, which we discuss in the next
section.
Mimetic vs Anchored Value Alignment
In order to understand the implications of the naturalistic
fallacy for VA, it is important to identify two possible types
of VA, distinguished by their form of value dependency:
• Mimetic VA is a fixed or dynamic process of mimesis
that imitates value-relevant human activity in order to
effect VA. The set of possible human activities subject
to mimesis includes preferences, survey results, big data
anlatyics of human behavior, and linguistic expressions
of value.
• Anchored (and Hybrid) VA is a fixed or dynamic
process that anchors machine behavior to intrinsic, i.e.,
first-order, normative concepts. When Anchored VA
includes a mimetic component it qualifies as ”Hybrid
VA”).
Anchoring means connecting behavior to intrinsic or non-
derivative values (Donaldson and Walsh 2015). Examples of
such intrinsic values are honesty, fairness, health, happiness,
the right to physical security, and environmental integrity.
An intrinsic value need not have its worth derived from a
deeper value. I may require health in order to enjoy mountain
climbing, but the worth of health stands on its own two feet,
unaccompanied by instrumental benefits. Examples of non-
intrinsic or derivative values are money and guns. I may value
money to protect my health or guns to enhance my security.
But neither possess intrinsic worth. Both are instrumental in
the service of intrinsic values.
We illustrate the difference between the two types of VA
through the simple example of honesty. A machine can be
programmed always to be honest,3 or or only honest to the
extent that the average person is honest (Ariely and Jones
2012). The former represents “anchored” VA; the latter,
“mimetic” VA. Below, we discuss selected examples of both
kinds of VA.
Mimetic VA
a. Microsoft’s Twitter-bot, Tay: An example of mimetic
VA is Microsoft’s AI twitter bot, Tay. Tay was taught to
engage with people through tweets. When the bot appeared
on Twitter, people started tweeting back disgusting racist
and misogynistic expressions. Tay’s replies began to align
with the offensive expressions. Microsoft terminated the
experiment immediately (Wolf, Miller, and Grodzinsky 2017).
Tay’s VA was mimetic in which prescription was inferred
3By “always being honest” we do not mean literally never
communicating a false proposition, but never communicating a
false proposition except when it satisfied well-known exceptions
from moral philosophy, for example, when the madman comes to
your door with a gun and asks for the location of your spouse.
Figure 1: Microsoft’s Twitter-bot Tay
from the description/observation of human behavior. The
case epitomizes the downside of committing the naturalistic
fallacy.
Related to this problem are instances of biased algorithms
(Dwork et al. 2012). For example, Amazon’s four year project
to create AI that would review job applicants’ resumes to
discover talent was abruptly halted in 2018 when the company
realized that the data gathered was man-heavy, resulting
in predictions based on properties that were man-biased. It
constitutes a simple example of how description can drive
illegitimate prescription (Dastin 2018).
b. Intelligent robot wheelchair: Johnson and Kuipers
(2018) developed an AI wheelchair that learns norms by
observing how pedestrians behave. The robot wheelchair
observed that human pedestrians stay right and behaved
consistently with humans do. This positive outcome was
possible because the human pedestrians behaved ethically,
unlike the twitter users in the case of Tay. But if the intelligent
wheelchair were on a crowded New York City street, the
mimetic imitation of infamously jostling pedestrians would
create a “demon wheelchair.” The researchers anchored
behavior by providing a mimetic context in which humans
refrained from unethical behavior. Thus, the intelligent
wheelchair represents, “hybrid VA,” not purely “mimetic
VA.” But providing the proper normative mimetic context
remains a problem for “hybrid VA.”
c. MIT Media Lab’s Moral Machine I:“Moral Machine”
is a web page that collects human perceptions of moral
dilemmas involving autonomous vehicles. The page has
collected over 30 million responses from more than 180
countries. One group of researchers (Kim et al. 2018)
analyzed this data and used it to develop “a computational
model of how the human mind arrives at a decision in a moral
dilemma.” They cautiously avoid the naturalistic fallacy,
explaining that their model does not pretend to “aggregate the
individual moral principles and the group norms in order to
optimize social utility for all other agents in the system.”
Their computational model aims, rather, to describe, not
prescribe, how humans make moral decisions. However, the
web page itself seems to conflate is with ought. Its title is
“Moral Machine.” A more accurate title would be “Opinions
about a Machine.”
Figure 2: MIT Media Lab’s Moral Machine website
Behavioral Economics and Mimetic VA
Before moving on to “anchored” VA, it is worth introducing
what behavioral economics had revealed about biases in
humans behavior. Humans are subject to predictable ethical
blind spots, such as self-favoring (“I’m more ethical than
you”) and the systematically devaluing of members of future
generations. These biases create problems for mimetic VA,
because insofar as AI imitates human behavior, it also
imitates human biases. For example:
• People almost never consciously do things that they be-
lieve are immoral. Instead, they offer false descriptions
that rationalize their (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011).
Rationalization is especially common when justifying
behavior after the fact (March 1994). Hence, insofar
as AI mimics human behavior, it too must offer false
descriptions, albeit ones that the AI “believes” are true.
• Owing to what has been called an “outcome bias,” if
people dislike the outcome, they see others’ behavior as
less ethical (Moore et al. 2006). AI mimesis would need
similarly to downgrade its evaluation of others when
outcomes were disliked.
• Cheating has been shown to lead to motivated forgetting
(Shu and Gino 2012). Mimetic VA would need to forget
aspects of cheating after the fact.
Such biases clearly constitute another drawback for mimetic
VA.
Anchored VA
d. MIT Media Lab’s Moral Machine II: Noothigattu et
al. (2017) show that the data from the“Moral Machine”
can also be used to develop an anchored model of VA,
i.e, one that uses intrinsic, first-order normative concepts.
The researchers interpreted the Moral Machine data using
computational social choice theory. Those who answered
the questions are regarded as choosers. The model aims to
find out which option globally maximizes utility. “Globally
maximized utility” is an intrinsic normative concept whose
worth need not be derived from a deeper concept. In this sense
it is similar to the concept of “happiness” used by traditional
Utilitarian philosophers. However, the VA in this instance
qualifies as a “hybrid” version of anchored VA insofar as it
uses facts about preferences to compile utility. To establish
maximal utility, the model uses Borda count—an election
method to award points to candidates based on preferences
and that declares the winner to be the candidate with the
highest points. Simply put, the VA process in this approach
can be represented as:
• Premise 1) People collectively awarded the highest point
to the option, saving the passenger than a pedestrian is
ethical/the right thing to do.”
• Premise 2) The option with the highest points is the right
thing to do [Borda count; Maximize overall utility]
• Conclusion) Therefore, “Saving the passenge” is the right
thing to do.
Here Premise 2) equates the normative concept of maximized
utility with facts about voting behavior, and while it is not
a simple mimetic reduction, does involve a questionable
transition from “is” to “ought.” Even though the argument is
logically valid, the truth of Premise 2) per se is questionable.4
Voting may be the best democratic political decision-
making procedure, but it is notoriously flawed as a moral
tool. One example: In 1838 Pennsylvania legislators voted to
deny the right of suffrage to black males (through a vote of
77 to 45 at the constitutional convention of 1837).
e. Combining utility and equity: Hooker and Williams
(2012) develop a mathematical programming model that
combines utility-maximization with the intrinsic value of
fairness. For fairness, they used the Rawlisan idea of
“maximin” which requires that a system maximize the
position of those minimally well-off. A key problem in
the MIT Media Lab’s electoral VA is that because it has
a single objective function of utility-maximization, the
model lacks deontic (obligation-based) constraints such as
fairness/equity/ individual rights, etc. Hooker and Williams’s
model effectively addresses this problem. McElfresh and
Dickerson (2017) further develop Hooker and Williams’s
model to apply it to kidney exchange.
f. Moral intuition-based VA: Anderson and Anderson
(2014) use an inductive logic programming for VA. The
training data reflect domain-specific principles embedded in
professional ethicists’ intuitions. For their normative ground,
Anderson and Anderson follow moral philosopher W.D. Ross
(1930), who believed that “[M]oral convictions of thoughtful
and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense-
perceptions are the data of a natural science.” Likewise,
Anderson and Anderson (2011) used “ethicists’ intuitions
to . . . [indicate] the degree of satisfaction/violation of the
assumed duties within the range stipulated, and which actions
would be preferable, in enough specific cases from which a
machine-learning procedure arrived at a general principle.”
Anderson and Anderson’s VA is a form of hybrid, not
purely anchored VA insofar as it is linked to a set of facts
about ethicists’ normative moral convictions. However, it
stops short of assuming that any and all moral convictions
are accurate guides, drawing instead upon the views of
4An argument may be valid even with false premises.
Figure 3: GENETH(Anderson and Anderson 2014)
“thoughtful and well-educated” persons. These views, it
presumes, are more likely to reflect intrinsic values accurately.
In general, caution is called for when using intuition as the
training data for AI systems. Intuition may be an important
part of ethical reasoning, but is not itself a valid argument
(Dennett 2013). Experimental ethicists show that moral
intuitions are less consistent than we think (e.g., moral
intuitions are susceptible to morally irrelevant situational
cues) (Alexander 2012; Appiah 2008) and even professional
ethicists’ intuitions fail to diverge markedly from those of
ordinary people (Schwitzgebel and Rust 2016).
g. Non-intuition-based VA: To address some weaknesses
of inductive logic and moral intuitions as a basis for VA,
Hooker and Kim (2018) develop a deductive VA model that
can equip AI with well-defined and objective intrinsic values.
They formalize three ethical rules (generalization, respect for
autonomy, and utility-maximization) by introducing elements
of quantified modal logic. The goal is to eliminate any
reliance on human moral intuitions, although the human agent
must supply factual knowledge. This model qualifies as an
anchored form of VA because it derives ethical principle
solely from logical analysis and not from moral intuitions. It
will also serve as a framework for hybrid VA, as proposed in
the section to follow.
For brevity, we focus on the generalization principle. It
rests on the universality of reason: rationality does not depend
on who one is, only on one’s reasons. Thus if an agent takes a
set of reasons as justifying an action, then to be consistent, the
agent must take these reasons as justifying the same action
for any agent to whom the reasons apply. The agent must
therefore be rational in believing that his/her reasons are
consistent with the assumption that all agents to whom the
reasons apply take the same action.
As an example, suppose I see watches on open display in a
shop and steal one. My reasons for the theft are that I would
like to have a new watch, and I can get away with taking
one.5 On the other hand, I cannot rationally believe that I
5Reasons for theft are likely to be more complicated than this, but
for purposes of illustration we suppose there are only two reasons.
would be able to get away with the theft if everyone stole
watches when these reasons apply. The shop would install
security measures to prevent theft, which is inconsistent with
one of my reasons for stealing the watch. The theft therefore
violates the generalization principle.
The principle can be made more precise in the idiom of
quantified modal logic. Define predicates
C1(a) = Agent a would like to possess an item on
display in a shop.
C2(a) = Agent a can get away with stealing the item.
A(a) = Agent a will steal the item.
Because the agent’s reasons are an essential part of moral
assessment, we evaluate the agent’s action plan, which in this
case is (
C1(a) ∧ C2(a)
)⇒a A(a) (1)
Here⇒a is not logical entailment but indicates that agent a
takes C1(a) and C2(a) as justifying A1(a). The reasons in
the action plan should be the most general set of conditions
that the agent takes as justifying the action. Thus the action
plan refers to an item in a shop rather than specifically to a
watch, because the fact that it is a watch is not relevant to my
justification; what matters is whether I want the item and can
get away with stealing it.
The generalization principle states that action plan (1) is
ethical only if
aP
(
C1(a) ∧ C2(a) ∧A(a)
∧ ∀x(C1(x) ∧ C2(x)⇒x A(x))) (2)
Here P (S) means that it is physically possible for proposition
S to be true, and aS means that a can rationally believe S
(i.e., rationality does not require a to deny S).6 Because (2)
is false, action plan (1) is unethical.
The fact that action plan (1) must satisfy (2) to be ethical
is anchored in deontological theory. There is no reliance on
human moral intuitions. However, (2) is itself an empirical
claim that requires human assessment, perhaps with the
assistance of mimetic methods. This suggests a hybrid
approach to VA in which both moral anchors and mimesis
play a role.
Hybrid VA
Ethical judgment relies on both formal consistency tests and
an empirical assessment of beliefs about the world. Hybrid
VA obtains the former using anchored VA and the latter using
mimetic VA. In the example just described, the generalization
principle that imposes condition (2) is anchored in ethical
analysis, while empirical belief alignment can assess whether
(2) is satisfied. One could take a poll of views on whether
I could get away with stealing unguarded merchandise if
everyone did so. Obviously, generally held opinions can be
irrational, but they can perhaps serve as a first approximation
of rational belief.
We acknowledge that even ethical value alignment can play
a role in hybrid VA. However, this is not because because
6The operator  has a somewhat different interpretation here
than in traditional epistemic and doxastic modal logics.
popular moral intuitions should be given epistemic weight,
but because they may be part of the fact basis that is relevant
to applying anchored ethical principles.
For example, in some parts of the world, drivers consider
it wrong to enter a stream of moving traffic from a side street
without waiting for a gap in the traffic. In other parts of the
world this can be acceptable, because drivers in the main
thoroughfare expect it and make allowances. Suppose driver
a’s action plan is (1), where
C1(a) = Driver a can enter a main thoroughfare by
moving into the traffic without waiting for
a gap.
C2(a) = It is considered acceptable in driver a’s part
of the world to move into a stream of traffic
without waiting for a gap.
A(a) = Driver a will move into traffic without waiting
for a gap.
The key to checking generalizability of action plan (1) is
assessing C2(a). If C2(a) is true, moving into the stream of
traffic under such conditions is generalizable because it is
already generalized, and traffic continues to flow because
drivers expect it and have social norms for yielding the right
of way in such cases.
Mimetic VA comes into play because assessing C2(a) is a
matter of reading generally held ethical values. The goal of
doing so, however, is not to align agent a’s ethical principles
with popular opinion, but to assess an empirical claim about
popular values that is relevant to applying the generalization
test.
Popular values in the sense of preferences can also be
relevant in a hybrid VA scheme. This is clearest for the
utilitarian principle, which says roughly that an action plan
should create no less total net expected utility (welfare) and
any other available action plan that satisfies the generalization
and autonomy principles. If people generally prefer a certain
state of affairs, one might infer that it creates more utility
for them. The inference is hardly foolproof, but it can be a
useful approximation. Again, there is no presumption that
we should agree with popular preferences, but only that the
state of popular preferences can be relevant to applying the
utilitarian test.
Even the autonomy principle can benefit from VA. The
principle states roughly that an action plan should not
interfere with the ethical action plans of other agents without
their informed or implied consent. Aggressively wedging into
a stream of traffic could violate autonomy, unless drivers give
implied consent to such interference. It could even cause
injuries that violate the autonomy of passengers as well
as the driver. However, if wedging into traffic is standard
and accepted practice, perhaps drivers implicitly consent to
such interference. They implicitly agree to play by the rules
of the road when they get behind the wheel, whether the
rules are legally mandated or a matter of social custom. The
social norms that regulate this kind of traffic flow also help
to avoid accidents. Here again, hybrid VA does not adopt
popular values but only acknowledges that they are relevant
to applying ethical principles.
Such a hybrid approach is suitable for AI ethics because
a machine’s instructions are naturally viewed as conditional
action plans much like those discussed here. If deep learning
is used, the antecedents of the action plans can include
the output of neural networks. The ethical status of the
instructions can then be evaluated by assessing the truth of a
generalizability condition similar to (2) for each instruction,
where mimetic VA plays a central role in this assessment.
This is analogous to the common practice of applying statistic
criteria for fairness (Corbett-Davies and Goel 2018), except
that the criteria are derived from general ethical principles
that are anchored in a logical analysis of action.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion reveals stumbling blocks for VA
approaches that neglect implications of the naturalistic fallacy.
Such problems are more serious in mimetic VA since the
mimetic process imitates human behavior that may or may
not rise to the level of correct ethical behavior. Anchored
VA, including hybrid VA, in contrast, holds more promise for
future VA since it anchors alignment by normative concepts
of intrinsic value.
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